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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Between 2008 and 2011, Viacom Inc. paid three of its 
senior executives—Board chairman Sumner Redstone, President 
and CEO Philippe Dauman, and COO Thomas Dooley—more 
than $100 million in bonus or incentive compensation.  
Although the compensation exceeding $1 million paid by a 
corporation to senior executives is not typically a deductible 
business expense under federal tax law, a corporate taxpayer 
may deduct an executive’s otherwise nondeductible 
compensation over $1 million if an independent committee of 
the corporation’s board of directors approves the compensation 
  4 
on the basis of objective performance standards and the 
compensation is “approved by a majority of the vote in a 
separate shareholder vote” before the compensation is paid.  In 
2007, a majority of Viacom’s voting shareholders approved such 
a plan with the intent to render the excess compensation paid by 
Viacom tax deductible (the “2007 Plan”).  One shareholder, 
appellant Robert Freedman, now claims that Viacom’s Board of 
Directors (the “Board”) failed to comply with the terms of the 
2007 Plan.  Freedman contends that, instead of using 
quantitative performance measures, the Board partially based its 
bonus awards on qualitative, subjective factors, thus destroying 
the basis for their tax deductibility.  Freedman alleges that this 
misconduct caused the Board to award its executives more than 
$36 million of excess compensation.  Freedman sued Viacom 
and all eleven members of its Board derivatively on behalf of 
Viacom for not complying with the 2007 Plan, and directly for 
allowing an allegedly invalid shareholder vote reauthorizing the 
2007 Plan in 2012.  On defendants’ motion, the District Court 
dismissed both claims by order entered on July 16, 2013.  See 
Freedman v. Redstone, Civ. No. 12-1052-SLR, 2013 WL 
3753426 (D. Del. July 16, 2013).  Freedman has appealed from 
that order but we will affirm.   
 
 At the outset we summarize the issues involved in this 
case and set forth our conclusions.  In a requirement familiar to 
corporate litigators, before bringing a derivative suit on behalf 
of a corporation a plaintiff must demand that the corporation’s 
board of directors bring the suit itself.  If the plaintiff does not 
make such a demand, the suit may proceed only if the plaintiff 
shows why a demand would have been futile, either because the 
board was interested in the challenged transaction or because the 
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board acted outside the protection of the business judgment rule 
in dealing with the matter in issue.  As Freedman did not make a 
pre-suit demand or present sufficient allegations explaining why 
a demand would have been futile, the District Court correctly 
dismissed his derivative claim.   
 
Freedman on his direct claim contends that, as a 
condition for allowing certain executive compensation in excess 
of $1 million to be tax deductible, federal tax law requires that 
the compensation be awarded pursuant to a plan approved in a 
vote of all the shareholders, even those otherwise without voting 
rights, thus preempting to this limited extent Delaware law 
authorizing corporations to issue non-voting shares as Viacom 
has done.  Because we find that federal tax law does not confer 
voting rights on shareholders not otherwise authorized to vote or 
affect long-settled Delaware corporation law which permits 
corporations to issue shares without voting rights, we conclude 
that Freedman has failed to state a direct claim on which relief 
may be granted.   
 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
 Viacom is a publicly traded entertainment corporation, 
incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in 
New York, New York.  Viacom’s Board of Directors has eleven 
members, all of whom are defendants in this case.  During the 
2011 fiscal year, Viacom earned more than $2 billion, and 
returned a substantial portion of those profits to its stockholders 
through cash dividends and stock buyback programs.     
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 As we have indicated, Freedman’s allegations center on 
the award of millions of dollars of incentive compensation to 
three Viacom executives.  We reiterate that typically executive 
compensation exceeding $1 million is not tax deductible, but 
that 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) provides an exception to the rule of 
nondeductibility where the corporation pays the compensation as 
a reward for performance measured by established, objective 
criteria and an independent compensation committee of the 
corporation’s directors administers the compensation plan.  26 
U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i); 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i).  In 
order for compensation paid pursuant to the exception to qualify 
for the favorable tax treatment, the taxpayer must disclose to its 
shareholders its plan to award such compensation and the plan 
must be “approved by a majority of the vote in a separate 
shareholder vote.”  26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii).   
 
 On May 30, 2007, Viacom’s shareholders approved this 
type of plan—the Senior Executive Short-Term Incentive Plan.  
The 2007 Plan capped the awards, limiting each executive’s 
eligibility for awards to the lesser of either eight times his salary 
or $51.2 million per year.  As these bonuses vastly exceeded § 
162(m)’s $1 million threshold, to ensure that the awards were 
tax deductible the 2007 Plan included provisions tying bonus 
awards to the achievement of specific, objective goals relating to 
Viacom’s financial performance.  The plan directed the 
Compensation Committee of Viacom’s Board to establish a 
performance period, designate which executives would 
participate, select which performance goals to use from a list 
included in the 2007 Plan, and set a performance target within 
each goal.  At the end of the performance period, the Committee 
was to certify “whether the performance targets have been 
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achieved in the manner required by Section 162(m).”  A. 63.  If 
the targets were satisfied, then the executives earned the award, 
although the Committee could, “in its sole discretion, reduce the 
amount of any Award to reflect” its assessment of a particular 
executive’s “individual performance or for any other reason.”  
A. 63-64.   
 
 The Committee selected several performance measures 
from the 2007 Plan and then set a range of performance goals 
for each measure.  Each executive was eligible to receive a 
bonus of different amounts, depending on where on the range 
Viacom’s performance ultimately fell.  Each executive was 
assigned a “target” bonus and, depending on Viacom’s actual 
performance, an executive’s bonus could be anywhere from 
25% to 200% of the target.  Because the Committee selected 
more than one performance measure, the Committee weighted 
each measure and then combined the weighted percentage with 
Viacom’s performance to calculate each executive’s award.   
 According to Freedman, the Committee failed to comply 
with the foregoing procedure.  He contends that, in addition to 
the objective performance measures drawn from the 2007 Plan, 
“the Committee also used subjective, non-financial qualitative 
factors to determine approximately 20% of the bonus awarded to 
each Officer,” and “wrongfully arrogated to itself the positive 
discretion to provide additional compensation based on the 
accomplishments of each executive in a particular year.”  A. 41-
42.  The Committee allegedly used “positive discretion” to 
increase the executives’ bonuses, resulting in an “excess” award 
of $36,645,750.  A. 42-47.   
  8 
 The complaint quantifies the difference between the 
“earned” bonus and the actual bonus for each executive in each 
of the three years at issue (2008, 2009, and 2010).  For example, 
in 2008 the Committee set Dauman’s “target bonus” at $9.5 
million (significantly less than the maximum bonus awards 
authorized by the 2007 Plan).  The Committee selected two 
performance goals: Operating Income, weighted at 34%, and 
Free Cash Flow, weighted at 29%.  It also assigned 20% weight 
to qualitative factors.   
The Committee then used these weighted factors—all of which 
were satisfied—to reduce Dauman’s actual bonus to $7,885,000 
(83% of the target).  Freedman argues that the 20% of the 
ultimate award attributable to qualitative factors was improper, 
and thus Dauman received $1.9 million in excess compensation. 
 A. 42-43.  Freedman characterizes this metric as a violation of 
both the 2007 Plan and 26 U.S.C. § 162(m), and calculates the 
total amount of excess compensation awarded to the three 
executives to be $36 million.   
 Treasury Regulations require corporations to obtain 
stockholder approval of executive compensation plans every 
five years, 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(vi), and Viacom thus 
sought stockholder approval of its compensation plan in 2012 
(the “2012 Plan”).  Viacom’s certificate of incorporation 
established two classes of stock: Class A shares, which have one 
vote per share, and Class B shares, which are not “entitled to any 
votes upon any questions presented” to Viacom’s stockholders.  
A. 156 (Certificate of Incorporation).  Because Redstone owns 
79.5% of Class A shares and obviously favored adoption of the 
plan, Freedman reasonably contends that the passage of the 2012 
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Plan was guaranteed “no matter what the other stockholders 
wanted.”1  A. 50.  On March 8, 2012, the Class A shareholders 
voted to approve the 2012 Plan.   
 On August 17, 2012, in response to the adoption and 
implementation of the plan, Freedman filed a complaint in the 
District of Delaware against all eleven Board members and 
Viacom, asserting both a derivative and a direct claim.  The 
derivative claim alleged that the Board wrongfully authorized 
the payment of excessive compensation.  Freedman contended 
that this authorization was an act of disloyalty and waste, and 
unjustly enriched the recipients of the compensation.  Therefore, 
in Freedman’s view, the authorization was not the product of a 
valid exercise of business judgment.  The direct claim asserted 
that the shareholder vote on the 2012 Plan violated 26 U.S.C. § 
162(m) because Class B shareholders could not participate in the 
vote.  Freedman reads § 162(m) as requiring that all 
shareholders be eligible to vote on plans to award tax-deductible 
compensation, thus, to that limited extent, preempting Delaware 
law which permits corporations to issue non-voting shares.  
Under this reading, Viacom, by excluding Class B shareholders 
                                                 
1
 Redstone also owns a large block of Class B shares but that 
point is immaterial. 
2
 Freedman contends that the District Court also had federal 
question and supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1340, and 1367, but we need not address this possibility. 
3
 The five independent directors are current and former members 
of the Compensation Committee.  The five directors who are not 
independent include the three executives receiving the 
compensation at issue (Redstone, Dauman, and Dooley), as well 
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from the shareholder vote, did not satisfy federal law insofar as 
the vote was intended to render the excess compensation tax 
deductible.  Freedman sought more than $36 million in 
damages, injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the 2012 
Plan, and a new vote—that would include Class B 
shareholders—to approve or reject the 2012 Plan.     
 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 because Freedman had not 
made a pre-suit demand on the Board, and under Rule 12(b)(6) 
because his complaint failed to state a valid claim.  On July 16, 
2013, the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.  
Freedman, 2013 WL 3753426, at *11.  The Court concluded that 
Freedman had failed to show that pre-suit demand on Viacom 
would have been futile, and had not sufficiently alleged facts 
that created a reasonable doubt that the Board took its 
challenged actions after its valid exercise of business judgment. 
 Therefore, the Court dismissed the derivative claim.  In 
dismissing Freedman’s direct claim, the Court rejected 
Freedman’s argument that 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) preempted 
Delaware corporation law with respect to shareholder approval 
of the compensation plan.  Freedman has appealed from both 
aspects of the July 16, 2013 order.   
 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
    The District Court had diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction over Freedman’s state law claims under 18 U.S.C. § 
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1332(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
  
We review a district court’s ruling on demand futility for abuse 
of discretion.  Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 
2007).  But to the extent that a party challenges the legal 
precepts employed by a district court, we apply plenary review.  
Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1040 (3d Cir. 1992).  We also 
apply plenary review to the District Court’s dismissal of 
Freedman’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  See Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 
119, 123 (3d Cir. 2010).  We accept all of Freedman’s factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and construe the complaint 
in the light most favorable to him.  Id.  In making our 
determination, we may consider “‘an indisputably authentic 
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to 
dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.’”  
Steinhard Grp. Inc. v. Citicorp., 126 F.3d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. 
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (explaining that courts may rely on documents 
extrinsic to the complaint on which the complaint is based).  
Like the District Court, we therefore consider the 2007 Plan, 
Viacom’s 2012 proxy statement, and Viacom’s certificate of 
incorporation.   
 
                                                 
2
 Freedman contends that the District Court also had federal 
question and supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1340, and 1367, but we need not address this possibility. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
We reiterate that Freedman’s complaint alleged both a 
derivative and a direct claim and we agree with the District 
Court’s order dismissing both claims.  First, the derivative claim 
fails because Freedman did not meet the requirements to excuse 
him from making a demand on the Board to bring the action on 
the theory that it would have been futile to make the demand.  In 
this regard, Freedman did not comply with Rule 23.1, which 
requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity their efforts to 
obtain the desired action from the directors or the reasons for 
not obtaining the action or making the effort to obtain that 
action.  Inasmuch as the complaint did not set forth any such 
facts, the requirement that Freedman make a demand was not 
excused.  Second, the Court properly dismissed the direct claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6) because the claim failed to state a cause of 
action.   
A. Freedman’s Derivative Claim  
 As we have indicated, before bringing a derivative suit, a 
shareholder must make a pre-suit demand on the company’s 
board of directors to give the board an opportunity to bring the 
suit on behalf of the corporation.  In re Merck & Co., Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2007); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring derivative 
complaints to “state with particularity” any attempted demand or 
the reasons for not making the demand, i.e. why a demand 
would have been futile); Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (same).  Although 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 provides the procedural 
vehicle for addressing the adequacy of a derivative plaintiff’s 
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pleadings, “[t]he substantive requirements of demand are a 
matter of state law.”  Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1047-48.  The 
decision whether to bring a lawsuit is “a decision concerning the 
management of the corporation and consequently is the 
responsibility of the directors.”  Id. at 1048 (citing Levine v. 
Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991)).  Because a derivative 
suit potentially could intrude into the sphere of managerial 
control, the demand requirement balances the interest of 
shareholders in pursuing valid claims against the interests of the 
board in managing the corporation.  Id.   
 But a court may excuse a plaintiff from satisfying the pre-
suit demand requirement if the demand would have been futile 
because the board could not make an independent decision on 
the question of whether to bring the suit.  In general, “directors 
are entitled to a presumption that they were faithful to their 
fiduciary duties,” and the putative plaintiff bears the burden of 
overcoming this presumption.  Beam ex. rel. Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 
(Del. 2004) (emphasis omitted); see also Levine, 591 A.2d at 
205-06.  To meet that burden under Delaware law, a complaint 
must include particularized facts creating reasonable doubt 
either that (1) “the directors are disinterested and independent,” 
or that (2) “the challenged transaction was otherwise the product 
of a valid exercise of business judgment.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).  “[I]f either prong is satisfied, 
demand is excused.”  Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 
2000).      
 1. Interest and Independence of Viacom’s Board  
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 As we set forth at the outset, Viacom’s Board of 
Directors has eleven members, and all are defendants and 
appellees in this case.  The parties agree that five of the directors 
are independent, and that five are not.
3
  Accordingly, to the 
extent that the case turns on the independence of the Viacom 
Board of Directors, the critical question is whether the eleventh 
director, Alan Greenberg, was independent.  Viacom classified 
Greenberg as an independent director under its Corporate 
Governance Guidelines and the NASDAQ listing standards.  
However, the complaint alleges that Greenberg is not 
independent because he “is a long-time close personal friend and 
an adviser to Sumner Redstone.”  A. 48 (Complaint ¶ 49).  
Freedman supports this allegation by citing In re Viacom Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, No. 602527/05, 2006 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 2891, at *10-12 (Sup. Ct. June 26, 2006) (In re: 
Viacom), in which a New York judge determined that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint contained allegations sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt that Greenberg was interested in the 
transaction at issue.
4
  Freedman argues that this 2006 New York 
                                                 
3
 The five independent directors are current and former members 
of the Compensation Committee.  The five directors who are not 
independent include the three executives receiving the 
compensation at issue (Redstone, Dauman, and Dooley), as well 
as Redstone’s daughter, Shari Redstone, and George Abrams.  
We do not focus on the distinction between the Board as a 
whole and the Compensation Committee as Freedman does not 
contend that either body usurped a function of the other.   
 
4
 In re: Viacom has a subsequent case history but we need not 
discuss it as it is not material to our result.  See In re: Viacom, 
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Supreme Court case conclusively decided that Greenberg is not 
independent, and that appellees thus are precluded from 
relitigating his independence under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.   
 Collateral estoppel bars relitigation where “the identical 
issue necessarily [was] decided in the prior action and [is] 
decisive of the present action,” and “the party to be precluded 
from relitigating the issue . . . had a full and fair opportunity to 
contest the prior determination.”  Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
482 N.E.2d 63, 67 (N.Y. 1985).
5
  The party, in this case 
Freedman, asserting that another party is collaterally estopped 
on a particular point has the burden of demonstrating that the 
issue on which he contends that other party is estopped was 
raised in the prior proceeding and was identical to the issue in 
the present proceeding.
6
  Howard v. Stature Elec., Inc., 986 
                                                                                                             
No. M-6074, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14718 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Nov. 30, 2006). 
 
5
 The law of the state of the issuing court—here, New York 
law—determines the preclusive effects of a judgment.  
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 
1999).     
 
6
 Freedman attempts to shift the burden on the issue to 
appellees.  He incorrectly claims that a prior determination “is 
preclusive in the second case, unless there is an affirmative 
showing of changed circumstances.”  Appellant’s br. at 13.  The 
New York Court of Appeals, in assessing whether a prior 
determination that directors were independent precluded 
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N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 2013).  In demand futility cases, a prior 
ruling on a director’s independence does not necessarily apply in 
a future proceeding addressing the same topic.
7
  See Bansbach 
v. Zinn, 801 N.E.2d 395, 402 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining that prior 
ruling on directors’ independence in demand futility context did 
not apply “for all time and in all circumstances”).  A 
determination of a director’s independence thus is concerned 
with a possibly fluid relationship and, accordingly, differs from 
the determination of a fixed historical fact in the first litigation 
such as a determination of which automobile went through a red 
light in an automobile accident case. 
 We find that Freedman has failed to carry his burden to 
show that the issue here is identical with the issue that the New 
York Supreme Court decided in In re: Viacom.  In re: Viacom 
                                                                                                             
plaintiffs from claiming they were not independent, placed the 
burden on the party asserting that collateral estoppel was 
applicable to show the identity of the issues in the successive 
litigation and did not automatically assume that the result in the 
prior case was preclusive in the latter case.  Bansbach v. Zinn, 
801 N.E.2d 395, 402 (N.Y. 2003).  We thus will decline 
Freedman’s invitation to overturn the long-settled principle that 
the party asserting collateral estoppel must show the identity of 
issues in order to invoke it.  See, e.g., Kaufman, 482 N.E.2d at 
67 (“The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the 
burden of demonstrating the identity of the issues….”).   
 
7
 In his brief, Freedman indicates that “[t]he sole basis for 
Greenberg’s alleged lack of independence is issue preclusion.”  
Appellant’s br. at 21. 
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was a derivative action that various shareholders brought in 
2006 against Viacom’s Board of Directors.  The plaintiffs in that 
case alleged that the Board breached its fiduciary duty by 
approving excessive compensation packages—totaling more 
than $159 million in one year—to three Viacom executives, 
including Redstone.  2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2891, at *2, *6-7. 
 Greenberg was one of the Board members approving the 
compensation.  The complaint alleged that Greenberg had a 
“long-standing close business and personal relationship with 
Redstone,” id. at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, as 
Redstone’s personal investment banker, that Greenberg directly 
advised him on two large acquisitions in 1993 and 1994 and on 
the unwinding of one acquisition in 2004.  Id. at *11.  Based on 
these facts—that Greenberg had “advised Redstone in his 
personal affairs in two large acquisitions, provided services and 
continues to provide services to Viacom”—the court concluded 
that plaintiffs had advanced a reasonable claim that Greenberg 
was interested in the transaction.  Id. at *11-12.  The court 
explained that the financial benefits Greenberg had received or 
potentially would receive as a result of his relationship with 
Redstone created an impermissible “taint of interest.”  Id. at *12. 
  
 But the issues here are not identical with those that the 
court considered in In re: Viacom.  First, unlike the complaint in 
In re: Viacom, Freedman’s complaint does not include any 
allegations regarding specific transactions in which Greenberg 
participated, and does not claim that Greenberg had received or 
in the future could receive financial benefits from Redstone that 
could taint his independent view of the executive compensation 
package at issue.  Second, seven years elapsed between the 
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filing of the In re: Viacom complaint in 2005 and the filing of 
Freedman’s complaint in this case in 2012.  Because 
“[i]ndependence is a fact-specific inquiry made in the context of 
a particular case,” Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049, as well as at a 
particular time, it would be inappropriate to adopt Freedman’s 
suggestion that we assume that the relationship between 
Redstone and Greenberg has remained static for seven years.  
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (cmt. c) (noting 
that, in some cases, “the separation in time and other factors 
negat[e] any similarity [so] that the first judgment may properly 
be given no effect”).   
 Rather, as appellees point out, In re: Viacom relied on 
Greenberg’s involvement through a firm with which he was 
associated, Bear Stearns, in specific transactions involving 
Viacom and Redstone personally in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
But by 2012, Bear Stearns no longer existed, and Greenberg had 
become a non-executive officer at JPMorgan Chase, the firm 
that acquired Bear Stearns.  JPMorgan Chase’s business 
dealings with Viacom are limited, and there are no allegations in 
the complaint that Greenberg has been involved in any specific 
transactions with Redstone or Viacom, or that he continues to be 
Redstone’s investment banker.  See Appellees’ br. at 24; A. 83 
(2012 Proxy Statement) (explaining Greenberg’s role at 
JPMorgan and that transactions with Viacom account for less 
than 1% of JPMorgan’s revenues).  The complaint does not 
contain any specific allegations suggesting that Redstone and 
Greenberg continue to have a relationship conveying what the 
court in In re: Viacom called the “taint of interest.”  
 Indeed, this case is indistinguishable from Bansbach v. 
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Zinn, in which the New York Court of Appeals would not apply 
collateral estoppel where the party asserting it “merely rel[ied] 
on the proof they put before the court in” an earlier proceeding, 
but did “nothing to substantiate their claims” in the current 
proceeding.  801 N.E.2d at 402.  Absent concrete allegations 
regarding the relationship between Redstone and Greenberg that 
suggest some financial benefit or control—like those presented 
in In re: Viacom—Freedman has not carried his burden to show 
the identity of the issues in the two cases, and thus collateral 
estoppel does not apply.  As collateral estoppel with respect to 
Greenberg’s independence is the only ground on which 
Freedman challenges the Board’s independence, the District 
Court correctly held that demand was not excused on the basis 
of the application of that doctrine.  See Freedman, 2013 WL 
3753426, at *8.  We therefore turn to the second prong of the 
demand futility test.   
  2. Exercise of Valid Business Judgment  
 Because Freedman failed to prove that the Viacom Board 
of Directors was not independent, he “must carry the ‘heavy 
burden’ of showing that the well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint create a reasonable doubt that its decisions were ‘the 
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.’”  White v. 
Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 551 (Del. 2001) (quoting Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 814).  The business judgment rule protects corporate 
managers from judicial interference with their informed, good 
faith business decisions.  When considering corporate litigation, 
courts presume that the business judgment rule applies so that 
unless a plaintiff presents evidence to the contrary, the court 
assumes that “the directors of a corporation acted on an 
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informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”  Levine, 
591 A.2d at 207 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 
overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.  A 
plaintiff bears a particularly heavy burden to overcome this 
presumption where, as here, a majority of independent, non-
management directors approved the transaction.  Id.; see also 
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988) (explaining 
that plaintiff bears a “heavy burden” to avoid pre-suit demand 
where majority of independent, disinterested directors approved 
transaction), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d 
244.  The business judgment rule protects an independent 
board’s compensation decisions, even those approving large 
compensation packages.  See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 n.56; 
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (“If an 
independent and informed board, acting in good faith, 
determines that the services of a particular individual warrant 
large amounts of money . . . the board has made a business 
judgment.”).   
 Freedman argues that the Compensation Committee’s 
actions fall outside the protection of the business judgment rule 
because its actions violated the terms of the 2007 Plan.  
Specifically, Freedman contends that the Committee used 
subjective factors to calculate the short-term compensation 
awards, thereby contravening the express terms of the 2007 Plan 
and rendering the excess compensation not tax deductible.  
Freedman correctly notes that in certain circumstances 
transactions that violate stockholder-approved plans may not be 
protected by the business judgment rule and thus the presence of 
those circumstances may excuse a plaintiff’s failure to make 
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demand on the board.  See, e.g., Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 
354 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“A board’s knowing and intentional 
decision to exceed the shareholders’ grant of express (but 
limited) authority raises doubt regarding whether such decision 
is a valid exercise of business judgment and is sufficient to 
excuse a failure to make demand.”); see also Weiss v. Swanson, 
948 A.2d 433, 441 (Del. Ch. 2008) (explaining that business 
judgment rule attaches only where board’s grant of stock options 
adheres to stockholder-approved plan).  
 Key to these cases, however—and missing from 
Freedman’s complaint—are particularized allegations regarding 
violations of a stockholder-approved plan.  In Ryan, for 
example, the plaintiff provided “specific grants, specific 
language in option plans, specific public disclosures, and 
supporting empirical analysis to allege knowing and purposeful 
violations of shareholder plans and intentionally fraudulent 
public disclosures.”  918 A.2d at 355.  Freedman’s allegations, 
by contrast, do not provide “sufficient particularity” to survive a 
motion to dismiss.  See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 355.   
 The 2007 Plan directed the Compensation Committee to 
establish performance targets from a list of objective measures, 
and, if those targets were met, authorized the Committee to 
award the maximum amount—the lesser of $51.2 million or 
eight times the executive’s base salary.  The 2007 Plan 
authorized the Committee “in its sole discretion, [to] reduce the 
amount of any Award to reflect the Committee’s assessment of 
the [executive’s] individual performance or for any other 
reason.”  A. 64.  Because the objective performance targets were 
met in all of the years at issue, the Committee was authorized to 
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award the maximum amount provided in the Plan (the lesser of 
$51.2 million or eight times base salary), or to adjust this 
amount downward and award less.  According to both the 2012 
Proxy Statement and appellees, the Committee did use 
subjective factors in determining each executive’s 
compensation, but only to adjust the award downward, which 
both the 2007 Plan and 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) permitted.   
 Freedman argues that the Committee used subjective 
discretion to adjust the awards upward, and that we should 
discard any claim that appellees make to the contrary because 
the basis for appellees’ claim “comes only from [their] briefs.”  
Appellant’s br. at 25.  Freedman is mistaken.  According to the 
plain terms of the 2007 Plan, the only limitations on short-term 
executive compensation are that (1) it only may be awarded 
based on objective performance targets established by the 
Compensation Committee; (2) if the target is not met, 
compensation may not be awarded; and (3) if the target is met, 
the award may not exceed the maximum authorized amounts.  
The allegations in the complaint do not suggest that any of these 
provisions were violated, and the 2012 proxy statement supports 
appellees’ position that the Compensation Committee followed 
the terms of the Plan in awarding short-term compensation.   
 Moreover, to the extent that the Compensation 
Committee did use subjective factors to calculate the amount of 
executive compensation awarded, Freedman has failed to 
explain why the Committee is not entitled to the protection of 
the business judgment rule.  As discussed above, the 2007 Plan 
authorizes the Committee to use subjective factors in calculating 
compensation.  In general, “a board’s decision on executive 
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compensation is entitled to great deference,” and “the size and 
structure of executive compensation are inherently matters of 
judgment.”  Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.  And the Delaware 
Supreme Court has held that a board does not have the duty to 
preserve tax deductibility under § 162(m) when awarding 
executive compensation.  See Freedman v. Adams, 58 A.3d 414, 
417 (Del. 2013) (“The decision to sacrifice some tax savings in 
order to retain flexibility in compensation decisions is a classic 
exercise of business judgment.”).   
 Although Freedman may disagree with the Board’s 
decision to award Viacom’s executives substantial short-term 
incentive compensation, the Board, acting through the 
Compensation Committee, did not exceed its powers under 
Delaware law, and we may not second guess its exercise of its 
business judgment in this matter.  Freedman was obligated to 
make a pre-suit demand.  Because he failed to do so, the District 
Court properly dismissed his derivative claim under Rule 23.1.   
B.  Freedman’s Direct Claim  
 Freedman also alleged that the vote to approve the 2012 
Plan was invalid because it did not include Class B shareholders. 
 According to Freedman, 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) gives all 
stockholders a “binding vote” on performance-based incentive 
compensation plans.  Appellant’s reply br. at 11.  He asserts that 
Viacom violated this provision by failing to include all 
shareholders in the vote on the 2012 Plan.  We find Freedman’s 
argument to be without merit: § 162(m) does not create 
shareholder voting rights, nor does it preempt long-established 
Delaware corporate law allowing corporations to issue non-
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voting shares.  Freedman purchased only non-voting shares; he 
cannot now use federal tax law as a backdoor through which he 
may pass to obtain rights that as a shareholder he does not 
possess.   
 First, and most fundamentally, 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) does 
not provide any voting rights to stockholders.  The provision is 
one subsection of a tax code provision listing the items that a 
taxpayer may deduct as business expenses but specifying that 
certain employee compensation exceeding $1 million is not tax 
deductible.  This restriction on deductibility does not apply to 
qualified performance-based compensation, where “the material 
terms under which the remuneration is to be paid, including the 
performance goals, are disclosed to shareholders and approved 
by a majority of the vote in a separate shareholder vote.”  26 
U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(ii); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-
27(e)(4)(i).  Contrary to Freedman’s assertions, § 162(m) does 
not mention voting rights or the mechanics of shareholder 
voting, or include any language that even hints that Congress 
intended to require that a corporation provide for voting rights 
of any kind.  Given this fact, Freedman has an uphill climb to 
show that Congress intended both to require that corporations 
grant shareholders certain voting rights, and to do so by 
displacing Delaware corporate law.   
 Delaware law presents an obstacle to Freedman’s attempt 
to obtain a judicial result that non-voting shares be allowed to 
vote.  Delaware law expressly grants corporations the right to 
issue stock with limitations, including limitations on voting 
rights.  See Del. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 151(a) (“Every corporation 
may issue 1 or more classes of stock . . . which . . . may have 
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such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers . . . .”); 
see also Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 806-07 (Del. 1966) 
(explaining that § 151(a) permits flexibility in stockholders’ 
rights, and confers express authority to issue non-voting stock).  
In a provision consistent with this authority, Viacom’s 
certificate of incorporation provides for two types of shares, 
Class A and Class B.  Each share of Class A stock is entitled to 
one vote, but the holders of Class B stock are not “entitled to 
any votes upon any questions presented to stockholders.”  A. 
156.  Therefore, Viacom was exercising its authority under 
Delaware law when it issued non-voting shares and, as a 
consequence, excluded the shareholders holding those shares 
from voting on the 2012 Plan.   
Freedman argues that federal tax law preempts Delaware 
law with respect to corporate votes but federal law does no such 
thing.  There are, broadly speaking, three types of preemption: 
express preemption, field preemption, and implied conflict 
preemption.  Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985).  
The Supreme Court directs us to two “cornerstones” in our 
preemption analysis: first, “the purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone in every preemption case,” and, second, we 
must presume that Congress did not intend to preempt state law 
absent evidence of a “clear and manifest” intention to do so.  
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194-95 
(2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 
S.Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996)).  This presumption against preemption 
is heightened in areas traditionally occupied by the states, such 
as corporate law, “including the authority to define the voting 
rights of shareholders.”  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 
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481 U.S. 69, 89, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987); see also 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. by Wolfson v. Adams, 961 F.2d 
405, 418 (3d Cir. 1992) (acknowledging the “states’ prerogative 
to define shareholder rights”).  Given that corporate law is an 
“area of traditional state regulation,” Freedman has a difficult 
task when he attempts to show preemption absent evidence of 
Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent to supersede state law.  
See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449, 125 
S.Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005). 
 As we discussed above, there is nothing in § 162(m)—
language, structure, or otherwise—suggesting that Congress 
intended to confer voting rights on non-voting shares by 
preempting state corporate law that permitted the issuance of 
non-voting shares.  Indeed, § 162(m) is concerned only with the 
tax status of various business expenses, and does not implicate 
corporate structure or governance.  Nonetheless, Freedman 
argues that § 162(m) preempts Delaware law under two separate 
theories: (1) Congress has occupied the field, and (2) the federal 
and Delaware laws conflict, making it impossible for a 
corporation to comply with both.  Neither argument has merit.   
 With respect to his first theory, field preemption, 
Freedman notes that “the Internal Revenue Code has occupied 
the field of federal taxation.”  Appellant’s br. at 34.  That 
occupation, however, as expansive as it may be, does not 
include the field of corporate governance and shareholder rights, 
matters only tangentially related to tax questions.
8
  After all, the 
                                                 
8
 We have no need in this opinion to refer to even a small sample 
of the circumstances in which the application of federal tax law 
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Supreme Court consistently has reiterated that corporate law, 
including governance and shareholder rights, is a field 
traditionally left to the states.  See, e.g., CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 
89, 107 S.Ct. at 1649; Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478, 99 
S.Ct. 1831, 1837 (1979).  Indeed, when we faced a preemption 
challenge based on the body of federal law most analogous to 
corporate law—securities laws—we rejected a field preemption 
argument because not even all the “federal securities laws taken 
together occupy the field of corporate law.”  Green v. Fund 
Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 222 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001).  We 
thus cannot find field preemption in this case.   
 Freedman’s second theory, conflict preemption, fares no 
better.  Conflict preemption allows federal law to override state 
law if it is impossible for a person to comply with both federal 
and state law, or if “state law erects an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”  Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713, 
105 S.Ct. at 2375).  Freedman contends that the latter situation 
applies here: in his view, the purpose of § 162(m) is to 
enfranchise all shareholders—even those holding non-voting 
shares—to vote on excess executive compensation, and thus § 
162(m) conflicts with Delaware’s law granting corporations 
permission to issue non-voting shares.
9
   
                                                                                                             
depends on rights established by state law. 
 
9
 Freedman thinks this case illustrates the effect of the conflict.  
Redstone controls the Class A voting shares, and this control 
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 Freedman points to one piece of legislative history to 
support his argument.  The House of Representatives 
Conference Report discussing the Federal Omnibus Tax Bill 
explains that compensation exceeding $1 million only can be 
deducted if the terms of the plan authorizing the compensation 
were disclosed to shareholders and “approved by a majority of 
shares voting in a separate vote.”  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-213, 
1993 WL 302291, at *587 (1993).  We fail to grasp how this 
report can be taken as evidence that Congress intended to 
enfranchise non-voting shareholders as the explanation merely 
addresses the need for the approval of the “majority of shares 
voting” to authorize compensation exceeding $1 million but 
does so without making reference to the shares that can vote.  It 
seems clear that the more natural reading of the congressional 
report is that the reference to “shares voting” means “voting 
shares;” it strains credulity to read this report to suggest that 
Congress intended to displace longstanding state corporate 
law.
10
   
                                                                                                             
guaranteed that the 2012 Plan would be adopted as he favored 
the plan.  Freedman claims this circumstance is at odds with 
Congress’s intent to provide all shareholders with a say over 
how executive compensation is awarded.  Yet if a single 
shareholder controlled a majority of all of the shares of a 
corporation and all the shares had equal voting rights, then 
Congress would have allowed that shareholder to decide the 
issue individually.    
 
10
 Even if this passage did aid Freedman’s case, we would 
hesitate to rely on legislative history given that the language of § 
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 Freedman’s other basis to support his claim of conflict 
preemption is that the regulations associated with other tax 
provisions, concerning incentive stock options and employee 
stock purchase plans, expressly mention “voting stock” when 
discussing shareholder approval.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.422-3(a) 
(“By a majority of the votes cast at a duly held stockholders’ 
meeting at which a quorum representing a majority of all 
outstanding voting stock is, either in person or by proxy, present 
and voting on the plan . . . .”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.423-2(c)(1)(i) 
(same).  Given that Congress thus “understood the difference 
between ‘stock’ and ‘voting stock,’” appellant’s br. at 35, 
Freedman reads the absence of this language in § 162(m) as an 
indication that Congress meant for non-voting stockholders to 
have a vote.   
Again, Freedman’s argument misses the mark.  First, he 
does not cite the prefatory language to 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.422-3, 
1.423-2(c)(1) which provides: “If the applicable State law does 
not prescribe a method and degree of stockholder approval . . . .” 
 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.422-3(a), 1.423-2(c)(1).  Contrary to Freedman’s 
contentions, these regulations emphasize that Congress did not 
intend the federal tax code to displace existing state law, and 
that Congress intended to supplement state law if—and only 
if—state law had not provided a mechanism for approving a 
particular plan.  Second, it is hard to see how the omission of a 
particular phrase in implementing regulations indicates a “clear 
                                                                                                             
162(m) unambiguously fails to provide the rights that he claims. 
 “Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the court should 
not consider statutory purpose or legislative history.”  In re 
Phila. Newspapers, LLC., 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).   
  30 
and manifest” intent to include something in statutory language. 
 The connection is far too tenuous to overcome the presumption 
against preemption.   
 Rather than displaying a “clear and manifest intention” to 
displace state law, all evidence—the unambiguous statutory 
language, as well as the legislative history and regulatory 
language offered by Freedman—indicates that Congress did not 
intend § 162(m) to confer voting rights on non-voting 
shareholders or that it even considered that possibility.  In our 
view, as is often the case, the most straightforward way to read 
legislation is correct: § 162(m) is nothing more than what it 
purports to be—a statute providing corporations with a 
mechanism by which certain otherwise excess nondeductible 
executive compensation over $1 million may become tax 
deductible.  It does not provide voting rights to stockholders 
holding non-voting shares, it does not override Viacom’s 
certificate of incorporation, and it does not supersede decades of 
established Delaware law.  Accordingly, we do not conclude 
that Congress has preempted Delaware Corporation law and we 
therefore hold that the District Court properly dismissed 
Freedman’s direct claim.11 
                                                 
11
 We note that Freedman does not assert that the Internal 
Revenue Service did not allow Viacom to deduct all of the 
compensation it paid to the executives.  Though we place only 
limited significance on this circumstance, the amount of 
compensation paid the executives was so large that it well may 
have come to the IRS’s attention.  See Lexington Nat’l Ins. 
Corp. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 326 F.3d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 2003).  Yet 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the District Court 
correctly dismissed Freedman’s derivative claim because he 
failed to make a pre-suit demand on Viacom’s Board of 
Directors, and properly dismissed Freedman’s direct claim as his 
complaint did not state a cause of action.  We thus will affirm 
the District Court’s order of July 16, 2013.   
                                                                                                             
so far as we are aware, the IRS did not challenge the 
compensation’s deductibility. 
